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RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION BASED ON EMPLOYER 
MISPERCEPTION 
DALLAN F. FLAKE* 
This Article addresses the circuit split over whether Title VII prohibits 
discrimination based on an employer’s misperception of an employee’s 
religion. This is an especially critical issue because misperception-based 
religious discrimination is likely to increase as the United States continues 
to experience unprecedented religious diversification. Some courts read 
Title VII narrowly to preclude such claims, reasoning that the statutory text 
only prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s actual religion. Other 
courts interpret the statute more expansively in concluding such claims are 
cognizable because the employer’s intent is equally malicious in 
misperception and conventional discrimination cases. I argue that the 
statutory text is ambiguous, but the legislative history, EEOC guidance, and 
the broader federal antidiscrimination regime all support recognition of 
misperception-based religious discrimination claims under Title VII. The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 
Inc. further confirms the validity of such claims, as the Court held that Title 
VII liability is premised on an employer’s discriminatory motive, not its 
actual knowledge of an individual’s religious practices. Thus, if an 
employer’s motive is the touchstone for liability, it matters not whether an 
employer accurately perceives an employee’s religion, so long as religion 
motivates the adverse employment decision. 
Introduction ...................................................................... 88 
I. Religious Misperception in a Changing America ...................... 91 
A. America’s Changing Religious Landscape ..................... 91 
B. Religious Misperception in the Workplace ..................... 95 
II. Title VII and Misperception Discrimination ........................... 98 
A. The Statutory Text .................................................. 98 
B. Legislative History ................................................. 100 
C. EEOC Guidance.................................................... 103 
D. Other Federal Antidiscrimination Laws ....................... 106 
III. Judicial Analysis of Misperception Discrimination ................. 109 
A. Key Cases Rejecting Misperception Discrimination ........ 111 
B. Key Cases Recognizing Misperception Discrimination ..... 117 
IV. Misperception Discrimination After Abercrombie .................. 124 
A. The Abercrombie Decision ....................................... 124 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio 
Northern University. I extend a special thanks to participants at the Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law for 
their insightful comments on this project. 
 88 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
B. Abercrombie’s Application to Misperception 
Discrimination .................................................... 127 
V. The Future of Misperception Discrimination ......................... 130 
Conclusion ....................................................................... 133 
INTRODUCTION 
Ashley graduated at the top of her class from Brigham Young 
University (BYU), which is owned and operated by The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Unlike the vast majority of BYU 
students, Ashley is Catholic rather than Mormon. Ashley moves home 
after graduation and applies for a teaching position at a local elementary 
school. Although highly qualified for the job, Ashley does not receive 
so much as a first interview. She later learns from a friend who teaches 
at the school that the principal rejected her application because he 
assumed she was Mormon based on where she had attended college. 
The principal was suspicious of Mormons and feared that if he hired 
Ashley, she would proselytize her students and coworkers. 
Although Ashley was not necessarily entitled to the job in 
question, she was nonetheless the victim of religious discrimination 
because she was denied an equal opportunity to be considered for the 
position under the school’s nonreligious hiring criteria.1 Despite this 
harm, there is a good chance Ashley will be unable to bring a claim 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—even though the statute 
expressly prohibits religious discrimination in employment. This is 
because courts are split over whether Title VII prohibits discrimination 
based on an employer’s misperception of an individual’s religion (or 
other protected characteristic).2 Some courts narrowly construe Title 
VII as only prohibiting discrimination based on an individual’s actual 
religion.3 Such courts would dismiss Ashley’s claim because the 
 
 1. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1976) (arguing that an applicant who is denied a job 
because of her race need not establish that she would have received a job offer but for 
her race to prove she was a victim of race discrimination; rather, “it suffices to show 
that, because of her race, she was denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the benefit—the 
opportunity to be considered under the employer’s nonracial criteria”). 
 2. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, sex, 
religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). For analytical purposes 
this Article focuses on misperception-based religious discrimination, but its arguments 
would likely apply with equal force to misperception discrimination based on Title 
VII’s other protected traits. 
 3. See cases discussed infra Part III.A. 
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principal did not discriminate against her based on her actual religion 
(Catholicism) but rather her perceived religion (Mormonism). 
Such a result undercuts Title VII’s goal of eradicating 
discrimination in the workplace.4 Employers who discriminate based on 
their erroneous beliefs about a person’s religion are no less 
discriminators simply because their perceptions were wrong. Why then 
should they be allowed to discriminate based on their ignorance, when 
courts have consistently held in other contexts that ignorance is not an 
excuse for breaking the law?5 Despite this inconsistency, surprisingly 
few commentators have pushed for judicial recognition of 
misperception discrimination,6 and there are only a handful of reported 
cases in which courts have allowed such claims to survive summary 
dismissal.7 Judicial resistance to misperception discrimination claims 
 
 4. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 
2391, 2393 (Comm. on the Judiciary) (observing that in enacting Title VII, Congress 
sought to “meet a national need” by “eradicating significant areas of discrimination on 
a nationwide basis” and “eliminat[ing] discriminatory employment practices by 
business”); see also id. at 2401 (“The purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate . . . 
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin.”). 
 5. See United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 
(1971) (“[I]gnorance of the law is no defense.”); United States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 
966, 968 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse.”); Cutler v. City of 
New York, No. 09 Civ. 5335 (PKC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97435, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 16, 2010) (explaining that ignorance of the law did not justify failure to timely file 
EEOC charge). 
 6. See D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: 
“Misperception Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 87, 101–02 (2013) (first using the term “misperception discrimination”); 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are 
White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1290 (2005); Craig Robert Senn, Perception over 
Reality: Extending the ADA’s Concept of “Regarded as” Protection Under Federal 
Employment Discrimination Law, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 827 (2009); Charity 
Williams, Note, Misperceptions Matter: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Protects Employees from Discrimination Based on Misperceived Religious Status, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 357, 358–59 (2008). 
 7. See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1299–300, 1304 (11th 
Cir. 2012); EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 401–02 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Kallabat v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., No. 12-CV-15470, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78944, at 
*8–11 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015); Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 85 F. 
Supp. 3d 841, 849–50 (D. Md. 2015); Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., No. 10 C 
8196, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103310, at *19–20 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2013); Henao v. 
Wyndham Vacations Resorts, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 978, 986–88 (D. Haw. 2013); 
Zayadeen v. Abbott Molecular, Inc., No. 10 C 4621, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12135, at 
*22–24 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2013); Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., No.  
3:08-cv-00375-LRH-RAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14971, at *12–13 (D. Nev. Feb. 
19, 2010); Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors, No. 02:07cv1464, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
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appears to stem almost entirely from the absence of language in Title 
VII explicitly allowing such claims. By contrast, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) specifically prohibits employment 
discrimination against individuals who are “regarded as” disabled.8 
This crucial difference between Title VII and the ADA led one district 
court to conclude, and several others to agree, that “Congress has 
shown, through . . . the [ADA] that it knows how to enact legislation 
that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected 
class.”9 Thus, if Congress had intended Title VII to apply to persons 
mistakenly regarded as belonging to a particular religion, it would have 
amended the statute accordingly.10 
I argue that discrimination claims based on an employer’s 
misperception of an individual’s religion should be cognizable under 
Title VII. Whether Title VII prohibits misperception discrimination 
cannot be determined from the statutory text alone, as the statute is 
ambiguous. However, the pertinent legislative history, U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidance, and the 
broader federal antidiscrimination regime all support the recognition of 
such claims. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in EEOC 
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.11 further confirms the validity of 
misperception claims, as the Court held that an employer cannot escape 
liability for refusing to hire an applicant whom it believes—but does not 
actually know—will need a religious accommodation.12 The Court 
reasoned that Title VII “does not impose a knowledge requirement . . . 
[but instead] prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the 
actor’s knowledge.”13 Because the Court held that Title VII liability is 
premised on motivation, not knowledge, it follows that an employer 
violates the statute if religion motivates an adverse employment action, 
 
LEXIS 72551, at *14–16 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2008); Berrios v. Hampton Bays Union 
Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 02-3124, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101366, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 12, 2007); LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770–71 
(D. Neb. 1999); Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1277–78 
(N.D. Ohio 1994); see also infra Part III for analysis of several of these cases. 
 8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(C), 12112(a) (2012). 
 9. Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 10. See Lewis v. N. Gen. Hosp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“In the [ADA], Congress provided for claims based on ‘perceived’ disability or being 
‘regarded as’ having a disability. If Congress had wanted to permit a similar cause of 
action under Title VII for ‘perceived religion’ discrimination, it could have so 
provided. It did not.” (citation omitted)). 
 11. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
 12. Id. at 2032–34. 
 13. Id. at 2032–33. 
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regardless of whether the employer’s perception of the employee’s 
religion is accurate. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explores America’s 
changing religious landscape and argues that the growing diversification 
of religion and religious expression increases the likelihood that 
employers will discriminate based on misperceptions about an 
individual’s religion. Part II explains how Title VII’s text is ambiguous 
regarding misperception discrimination and considers how the statute’s 
legislative history, EEOC guidance, and the broader federal 
antidiscrimination scheme support the recognition of such claims. Part 
III examines judicial analysis of misperception discrimination under 
Title VII. Courts that reject misperception claims tend to rely on a 
single provision of the statute in isolation, whereas courts that 
recognize such claims typically focus on Title VII’s overarching 
purposes and the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute. Part IV analyzes 
the Abercrombie decision and addresses how the holding applies to 
misperception-based religious discrimination. Part V discusses the 
ramifications of allowing religious misperception claims after 
Abercrombie. 
I. RELIGIOUS MISPERCEPTION IN A CHANGING AMERICA 
Misperceiving a person’s religious beliefs is hardly a new 
phenomenon. But it is one that is likely to increase. This Part examines 
how the United States’ religious landscape is changing both in terms of 
the variety of religious sects and the ways in which people are choosing 
to express—or not to express—their religious beliefs. It then considers 
how these changes are likely to increase the threat of  
misperception-based religious discrimination in American workplaces 
already rife with religious conflict. 
A. America’s Changing Religious Landscape 
The United States is more religiously diverse than ever before and 
will likely continue to diversify in coming years.14 Although the United 
States remains predominantly Christian, with 70.6% identifying with 
some branch of the religion, non-Christian faiths continue to make 
 
 14. See PAUL D. NUMRICH, THE FAITH NEXT DOOR: AMERICAN CHRISTIANS 
AND THEIR NEW RELIGIOUS NEIGHBORS 6 (2009).  
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considerable gains.15 Between 2007 and 2014 alone, the percentage of 
Americans affiliated with non-Christian religions rose from 4.7% to 
5.9%.16 Immigration continues to be the primary driver of religious 
diversification, resulting in greater numbers of Buddhists, Muslims, 
Baha’is, and other non-Christians.17 Immigration has also contributed to 
greater internal diversity within established religious traditions.18 
American Judaism, for example, has become increasingly diverse 
because of the influx of Jewish immigrants from Russia and Ukraine.19 
Christianity in the United States has likewise undergone a remarkable 
transformation due to sizeable Latino, Filipino, and Vietnamese 
Catholic communities; Korean Presbyterians; Indian Mar Thomas; and 
Egyptian Copts, among many others.20 
The growing diversity of religions in American society is likewise 
evident in its workforce. Indeed, religious-discrimination plaintiffs have 
professed an impressive range of beliefs in recent lawsuits. For 
example, a Costco cashier who belonged to the Church of Body 
Modification sued her employer for forcing her to cover her religiously 
mandated tattoos and piercings.21 A manager filed suit after his 
employer discovered he belonged to the World Church of the Creator, 
which promotes white supremacy.22 An IRS agent sued the federal 
government for firing her because she refused to remove her kirpan, a 
Sikh ceremonial sword.23 A Walmart employee, who described his 
religion as “Universal Belief System,” filed a lawsuit challenging his 
employer’s policy that prohibited him from simultaneously wearing 
various pieces of religious attire, including a priest’s shirt, a Muslim 
headdress, a fanny pack with an anarchy symbol, a chain with multiple 
 
 15. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 3 
(2015) [hereinafter CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE], http://www.pewforum.org/ 
2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. at 2, 3, 11 (Christians comprise 70.6% of the American 
population, whereas Buddhists make up 0.7%, Muslims comprise 0.9%, and Hindus 
and members of other world religions constitute 1.0%.). 
 18. See DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A “CHRISTIAN 
COUNTRY” HAS NOW BECOME THE WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION 1–4 
(2001).  
 19. Id. at 4. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 128–30 (1st Cir. 
2004). 
 22. Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1015–17 (E.D. 
Wis. 2002). 
 23. Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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crosses hanging from it, and a necklace with a crucifix.24 The EEOC 
recently announced a lawsuit against a New York–based health network 
that required employees to participate in a belief system called 
“Onionhead.”25 The Commission alleges employees were forced to 
wear Onionhead buttons, participate in prayers and candle burning, and 
keep only dim lighting in the workplace.26 
Apart from the growing number of religious sects, there is also 
greater variation in how people express their religious beliefs. For 
instance, a recent survey found that the percentage of U.S. Catholics 
who self-identify as “strong” members has plummeted from 46% in 
1974 to 27% in 2012.27 As the strength of religious identity has 
declined among Catholics, so too has weekly church attendance: 47% 
of Catholics attended mass weekly in 1974, compared to just 24% in 
2012.28 By contrast, religious identity among Protestants appears to 
have strengthened during this same time period: the percentage of 
“strong” Protestants increased from 43% to 54%, and weekly church 
attendance rose from 29% to 38%.29 Diversity is also growing within 
more traditionally homogenous faiths. For example, a recent study 
found a surprising amount of variation among the Amish on a wide 
range of behaviors, from family planning to cow milking.30 Within 
Islam, there are substantial differences in women’s religious coverings, 
with some Muslim women wearing burkas, others wearing headscarves, 
others wearing face veils, and still others opting for no head covering at 
all.31 
 
 24. Lorenz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-0319, 2006 WL 1562235, at  
*2–3, 6 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2006). 
 25. See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Sues United Health Programs of 
America and Parent Company for Religious Discrimination (June 11, 2014), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-11-14.cfm. 
 26. See id. 
 27. PEW RESEARCH CTR., ‘STRONG’ CATHOLIC IDENTITY AT A FOUR-DECADE 
LOW IN U.S. 1 (2013), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/03/Strong-Catholic-
Identity-version-3-13-13-for-web.pdf. 
 28. Id. at 2. 
 29. Id. at 1, 3. 
 30. See generally Mark Scolforo, New Research Shows Diversity Among US 
Amish Groups, DENVER POST (June 3, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ 
nationworld/ci_23378069/new-research-shows-diversity-among-us-amish-groups 
(describing key findings from study). 
 31. See Faegheh Shirazi & Smeeta Mishra, Young Muslim Women on the Face 
Veil (Niqab): A Tool of Resistance in Europe but Rejected in the United States, 13 INT’L 
J. CULTURAL STUD. 43, 44–47 (2010) (explaining variations in veiling practices among 
Muslim women). 
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One of the most significant changes in America’s religious 
landscape is the increasing fluidity of religious affiliation. Nearly half 
of American adults “have either switched religious affiliation, moved 
from being unaffiliated with any religion to being affiliated with a 
particular faith, or dropped any connection to a specific religious 
tradition altogether.”32 Whereas older Americans who change religious 
affiliations tend to switch “from one family to another within a 
religious tradition,” affiliation changes tend to be much more drastic 
among younger Americans.33 Nearly three-fourths of adults under age 
thirty who change religious affiliations leave one religious tradition for 
another or for no religion at all.34 While it is relatively common for 
Americans to switch religious affiliations, recent research suggests that 
most people who leave a religion choose not to affiliate with another 
religion. Between 2007 and 2014, the percentage of “unaffiliateds” 
jumped from 16.1% to 22.8%—an increase of 6.7 percentage points in 
just seven years.35 Importantly, nonaffiliation should not be mistaken 
for nonbelief: a full two-thirds of unaffiliated adults still believe in 
God, more than half feel “a deep connection with nature and the 
earth,” approximately one-third classify themselves as “‘spiritual’ but 
not ‘religious,’” and one-fifth pray daily.36 Despite their nonaffiliation, 
this growing segment of Americans is still entitled to Title VII’s 
protection from religious discrimination. Courts have consistently held 
that a lack of formal religious affiliation in no way disqualifies a 
plaintiff from asserting a religious discrimination claim under Title 
VII.37 
 
 32. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
SURVEY, RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 5 (2008), 
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/05/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf. 
 33. Id. at 33. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE, supra note 15, at 3. 
 36. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGIOUS & PUB. LIFE, “NONES” ON THE RISE:  
ONE-IN-FIVE ADULTS HAVE NO RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 9–10 (2012), 
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf. 
 37. See, e.g., Scott v. Montgomery Cnty. Sch. Bd., 963 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547, 
559 n.11 (W.D. Va. 2013) (plaintiff who described her religious beliefs as “orthodox 
Christianity” not precluded from bringing Title VII claim based on lack of formal 
religious affiliation because “the statute protects persons who are not members of 
organized religious groups”); see also EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 
F.3d 1106, 1117 (10th Cir. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2008 (2015) 
(“Religion includes not only traditional, organized religions . . . but also religious 
beliefs that are new, uncommon, not part of a formal church or sect, only subscribed to 
by a small number of people, or that seem illogical or unreasonable to others.” (quoting 
EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 12-I(A)(1) (2008), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ 
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A final trend with important ramifications for misperception 
discrimination is the growing number of Americans who mix multiple 
faiths, rather than fitting neatly into a singular religious classification. 
A Pew survey found that “large numbers of Americans engage in 
multiple religious practices, mixing elements of diverse traditions.”38 
For instance, it is not uncommon today for Americans to “blend 
Christianity with Eastern or New Age beliefs such as reincarnation, 
astrology and the presence of spiritual energy in physical objects.”39 
The survey also found that more than one-third of Americans either 
regularly (9%) or occasionally (26%) attend worship services at more 
than one place, and nearly one-quarter report sometimes attending 
religious services of a faith different from their own.40 The study 
predicts that as religiously mixed marriages become increasingly 
common, involvement in multiple faith communities will become even 
more normalized.41 
The foregoing trends illustrate the growing complexity of religion 
in the United States today. While it has never been wise to make 
assumptions about a person’s religious beliefs, it is even less so now. 
Not all Amish drive buggies, not all Jews abstain from eating pork, and 
not all Catholics attend mass. Women wear headscarves for both 
religious and secular reasons, Mormons live in places other than Utah, 
and some Jehovah’s Witnesses donate blood. Moreover, most people 
who are unaffiliated with formal religion are not atheists, not everyone 
who attends weekly services is religious, and some people consider 
themselves members of multiple faiths. In short, as the United States 
continues to experience unprecedented religious diversification, the 
potential for misperceiving a person’s religion will only increase. 
B. Religious Misperception in the Workplace 
It is often more difficult to correctly assess people’s religious 
beliefs than their race, color, sex, or even national origin. Unlike Title 
VII’s other protected traits, a person’s religion generally cannot be 
 
religion.pdf); Bushouse v. Local Union 2209, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1076 n.15 (N.D. 
Ind. 2001) (noting that Title VII has a “broad definition” of religious belief). 
 38. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, MANY AMERICANS MIX MULTIPLE 
FAITHS 1 (2009), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2009/12/multiplefaiths.pdf. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 2 (discussing link between religiously mixed marriages and 
attending multiple types of worship services). 
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detected from outward appearance alone.42 Even national origin is more 
readily discernable than religion, as it tends to be more socially 
acceptable to ask other people where they are from than about their 
religious beliefs. Consequently, a person may look for clues about 
others’ religious identity based on where they are from, the schools 
they attend, their manner of dress and grooming, their dietary 
restrictions, their vocabulary, their names, and a host of other 
characteristics. This is problematic for several reasons, not least of 
which is the fact that Americans tend to be fairly ignorant about 
religions other than their own.43 The Pew Forum on Religion and 
Public Life’s study of Americans’ religious knowledge paints a fairly 
bleak picture in this regard.44 On average, respondents correctly 
answered just sixteen of thirty-two religious knowledge questions in the 
survey.45 Fewer than two-thirds (63%) correctly named Genesis as the 
first book of the Bible, about half (52%) said, incorrectly, that 
Catholicism teaches that the bread and wine used for Communion are 
merely symbolic of the body and blood of Jesus, fewer than one in five 
(16%) correctly identified Protestantism as the religion that traditionally 
teaches that salvation comes through faith alone, fewer than half (45%) 
correctly answered that the Jewish Sabbath begins on Friday, and just 
over half (54%) named the Koran as the holy book of Islam.46 
Additionally, only about one-third (38%) correctly associated Vishnu 
and Shiva with Hinduism, and fewer than half (47%) knew the Dalai 
Lama is Buddhist.47  
In short, conditions are ripe for religious misperception in the 
workplace, given the growing complexity of religion, the lack of 
outward manifestations of a person’s religion, the reluctance to inquire 
 
 42. This is not to suggest that matters of racial, sexual, or national origin 
identity are necessarily straightforward. See Greene, supra note 6, at 101 (“With 
increased immigration, cultural diversity, interracial marriages, and transracial 
adoptions, as well as more formal recognition of mixed-race classifications and more 
fluid conceptualizations of gender, racial, and cultural identity, courts will likely 
encounter more discrimination cases where an alleged dissonance exists between the 
employer’s categorization of an employee and the employee’s self-identification.”). 
 43. See STEPHEN PROTHERO, RELIGIOUS LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN 
NEEDS TO KNOW—AND DOESN’T 1 (2007) (“Americans are both deeply religious and 
profoundly ignorant about religion.”). 
 44. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 
SURVEY (2010), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2010/09/religious-knowledge-full-
report.pdf. 
 45. Id. at 6. 
 46. Id. at 20–29. 
 47. Id. at 8. 
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about others’ religious beliefs, and general ignorance about religion. 
Therefore, the probability is high that employers, who likely are not 
experts on the subtle nuances of religious diversity, will misperceive 
the religious beliefs of their employees. The potential for 
misperception-based religious discrimination is further heightened by 
the fact that the American workplace is already “a tinderbox for 
religious conflict.”48 Media reports of religious discrimination at work 
seem a near daily occurrence.49 The EEOC has also experienced an 
uptick in both the number and percentage of charges alleging religious 
discrimination. In 1997, the EEOC received 1,709 religious 
discrimination complaints, constituting 2.1% of all charges.50 By 2015, 
that number more than doubled to 3,502, which constituted 3.9% of all 
charges.51 In light of this trend, the EEOC has become more proactive 
in educating employers about religious discrimination. For example, in 
the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the EEOC issued 
guidance on the rights of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and Sikhs 
under the employment laws after experiencing what it characterized as 
“a significant increase in the number of charges alleging workplace 
discrimination based on religion and/or national origin.”52 More 
 
 48. Dallan F. Flake, Image is Everything: Corporate Branding and Religious 
Accommodation in the Workplace, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 703 (2015). 
 49. See, e.g., Kate Abbey-Labertz, Ford Worker Fired for Anti-Gay Comment 
Sues for Religious Discrimination, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2015, 9:23 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/thomas-banks-ford-
lawsuit_55a42530e4b0a47ac15d2669 (reporting that ex-employee filed a religious 
discrimination claim after Ford fired him for posting an anti-gay comment on the 
company website); Paula Burkes, EEOC Files Lawsuit Against UPS on Religious 
Discrimination Claims, OKLAHOMAN (July 21, 2015), http://newsok.com/eeoc-files-
lawsuit-against-ups-on-religious-discrimination claims/article/5435222 (reporting that 
the EEOC has sued UPS for religious discrimination based on its grooming policy that 
prohibits certain male employees from wearing beards or growing their hair below 
collar length); EEOC Sues Rotten Ralph’s Restaurant for Religious Discrimination, 
NAT’L L. REV. (July 12, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/eeoc-sues-rotten-
ralph-s-restaurant-religious-discrimination (discussing EEOC lawsuit against restaurant 
that terminated a Muslim server for wearing a headscarf to work); NC Dunkin’ Donuts 
to Pay $22,000 to Settle Religious Discrimination Lawsuit, FOX8 (July 16, 2015, 9:18 
PM), http://myfox8.com/2015/07/16/nc-dunkin-donuts-to-pay-22000-to-settle-religious-
discrimination-lawsuit/ (reporting settlement of lawsuit alleging Dunkin’ Donuts refused 
to hire Seventh-Day Adventist applicant because he could not work Saturdays). 
 50. Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Questions and Answers About Workplace Rights Muslims, South Asians, 
and Sikhs under the Equal Employment Opportunity Laws, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
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recently, the EEOC issued a question-and-answer guide on religious 
garb and grooming in response to growing concerns that employer 
dress codes are unfairly stifling employees’ religious expression.53 
Given the current state of religion in America, and in the 
workplace in particular, it is critical that courts are unified in their 
approach to misperception-based religious discrimination. Failure to do 
so not only potentially works an injustice to the victims of such 
discrimination but may also disincentivize employers from attempting 
to understand an employee’s religious beliefs. Because of the 
complexity of religion today, it would be too easy for an employer to 
escape liability by pleading ignorance about a person’s religion. If 
courts continue to allow employers to discriminate so long as they get a 
person’s religion wrong, what motivation will employers ever have to 
get it right? 
II. TITLE VII AND MISPERCEPTION DISCRIMINATION 
Because Title VII does not explicitly prohibit misperception 
discrimination, it is the province of the courts to determine whether 
Congress intended for the statute to cover such claims.54 The text of 
Title VII itself is ambiguous as to whether misperception discrimination 
claims are cognizable under the statute. However, other sources, 
including the relevant legislative history, EEOC guidance, and the 
broader federal antidiscrimination regime, support the conclusion that 
Congress did, in fact, intend for Title VII to cover misperception 
discrimination. 
A. The Statutory Text 
It is unclear from Title VII’s text alone whether the statute 
prohibits misperception discrimination. This is because inconsistencies 
in two key provisions render it susceptible to different interpretations. 
 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/backlash-
employee.cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
 53. Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and 
Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION [hereinafter Religious 
Garb and Grooming], http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_religious_garb_ 
grooming (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
 54. See Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning 
Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1299, 1299 (1975) (“[T]he function of a court when dealing with a statute is to 
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”). 
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The first provision, § 2000e-2(a)(1), prohibits employers from refusing 
to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating “against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”55 Standing alone, courts could—and sometimes do—
interpret this provision narrowly as prohibiting only discrimination that 
is based on an individual’s actual religion or other protected trait.56 This 
is because the phrase “because of such individual’s” immediately 
precedes the list of protected traits, suggesting a discrimination claim 
must be rooted in an individual’s actual, rather than perceived, 
characteristic. 
Of course, § 2000e-2(a)(1) is not a standalone provision but must 
be read in conjunction with the rest of Title VII.57 Significantly, 
Congress added § 2000e-2(m) to the statute in 1991 to clarify that an 
employer commits an unlawful employment practice “when the 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”58 Because 
subsection (m) does not include the “because of such individual’s” 
language present in subsection (a)(1), when read in isolation subsection 
(m) appears to prohibit employment decisions motivated by religion 
more generally. It seems that if Congress had intended to only ban 
discrimination motivated by a person’s actual religion, it could have 
done so easily enough by making the language of subsection (m) 
consistent with the language of subsection (a)(1). The fact that 
Congress chose not to use such language raises the possibility that it 
never meant for Title VII to apply only to discrimination based on a 
person’s actual characteristics. There is a clear conflict between 
subsections (a)(1) and (m). Under the former, Ashley could not bring a 
Title VII claim because the principal did not discriminate against her 
“because of such individual’s . . . religion.”59 But under the latter, 
Ashley could bring suit because “religion . . . was a motivating factor” 
in the employment decision.60 How could Title VII simultaneously 
recognize and reject Ashley’s claim? Either the statute prohibits 
 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 56. See cases discussed infra Part III.A. 
 57. See Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1564 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that all parts of a statute must be construed together without 
according undue importance to a single or isolated portion).  
 58. § 2000e-2(m). 
 59. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 60. § 2000e-2(m). 
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misperception discrimination or it does not; it cannot do both. Because 
the statutory text is capable of two meanings, it is impossible for courts 
to discern Congress’ intent by examining the statute’s plain language 
alone.61 When a statute is ambiguous, which is the case here,62 courts 
“seek guidance in the statutory structure, relevant legislative history, 
congressional purposes expressed in the [pertinent act], and general 
principles” of law applicable to the circumstances of the statute to 
determine the appropriate interpretation.63 
B. Legislative History 
Title VII is widely regarded as one of the most significant pieces 
of civil rights legislation Congress has ever enacted.64 From the outset, 
Congress made clear that “[t]he purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate, 
through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, 
discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national 
origin.”65 Although courts may disagree over how to interpret various 
provisions of the statute, they are unified in their understanding that the 
intent of Title VII is to “eradicat[e] prohibited forms of discrimination 
 
 61. See In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438, 446 n.11 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992) 
(holding that tension between statutory provisions “creates an ambiguity that renders 
this so-called ‘plain meaning rule’ inapplicable” (citing United States v. Fairman, 947 
F.2d 1479, 1481–82 (11th Cir. 1991))). 
 62. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 736–37 (1985) 
(declaring that when a statute is capable of more than one reasonable reading, it is 
ambiguous on its face); United States v. White Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir. 
2006) (“Under statutory interpretation, a statute is ambiguous if it is ‘capable of being 
understood in two or more possible senses or ways.’” (quoting Chickasaw Nation v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 90 (2001)). 
 63. Lorion, 470 U.S. at 737; see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 
337, 345–46 (1997) (interpreting ambiguous term in Title VII by considering the 
“primary purpose” of the statute). 
 64. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS 
OF EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 6 (2d ed. 2007) (“In its provisions in Title VII, 
the act created the most important of the statutory prohibitions against employment 
discrimination and the one that most clearly expanded upon the protection offered by 
the Constitution.”); Norbert Schlei, Foreword to BARBARA SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW vii (2d ed. 1983) (“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was the most important civil rights legislation of this century. Title VII of that Act . . . 
has been its most important part.”); Hubert H. Humphrey, Preface, 20 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 219, 219 (1976) (“In my opinion, winning passage of enforceable federal standards 
to achieve equal employment opportunity surely was one of the most significant 
legislative actions of this generation.”). 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 
2401; see also 110 CONG. REC. 13079–80 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark). 
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from the workplace.”66 According to the Supreme Court, “The 
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure 
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those 
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered . . . stratified 
job environments to the disadvantage of . . . minority citizens.”67 The 
Court has further explained that the “intent to drive employers to focus 
on qualifications rather than on race, religion, sex, or national origin is 
the theme of a good deal of the statute’s legislative history.”68 
Although the legislative record does not directly reference 
misperception discrimination, it nonetheless contains important insights 
into what Congress hoped to accomplish through Title VII. An 
interpretive memorandum entered into the Congressional Record by 
Senators Case and Clark, co-managers of the bill in the Senate, is 
particularly noteworthy in its explanation that “[t]o discriminate is to 
make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and 
those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are 
prohibited . . . are those which are based on any five of the forbidden 
criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.”69 The authors’ 
concern lay not with whether a person claiming discrimination was 
actually black or male or Baptist; instead, they sought to enact 
sweeping legislation to eliminate distinctions and differential treatment 
in employment “based on” any of the protected traits more generally. 
Title VII’s legislative history is replete with references to enacting 
a national policy of equal opportunity in employment free from 
wrongful discrimination, yet makes frustratingly little mention of the 
intended scope of the statute.70 However, further insight into Congress’ 
 
 66. Martin v. United Way of Erie Cnty., 829 F.2d 445, 449 (3d Cir. 1987); 
see also Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting 
that joint employer doctrine “serves Title VII’s purpose of eliminating ‘discrimination 
in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin’” (quoting Lucido 
v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y 1977)));  
Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 104 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(referencing Title VII’s “dual purposes of eliminating discrimination and making its 
victims whole” (citing Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1997))); 
Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(explaining Title VII’s purpose is to “eliminate all discriminatory employment 
practices” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2391, 2401)). 
 67. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). 
 68. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989). 
 69. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added). 
 70. See Patricia Davidson, The Definition of “Employee” Under Title VII: 
Distinguishing Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 
203, 205 (1984). 
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intent can be discerned from two other sources. First, in considering 
the Title VII-amending Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 
Congress “openly discussed” concerns over employers discriminating 
against female employees based on their misperceptions about women 
of childbearing age.71 Congress emphasized the need not just to protect 
women who are pregnant, have given birth, or who experience related 
medical conditions, but also those who may be misperceived as such: 
[T]he assumption that women will become pregnant and leave 
the labor force leads to the view of women as marginal 
workers, and is at the root of the discriminatory practices 
which keep women in low-paying and dead-end jobs. 
. . . . 
. . . Women are still subject to the stereotype that all women 
are marginal workers. Until a woman passes the child-bearing 
age, she is viewed by employers as potentially pregnant. 
Therefore, the elimination of discrimination based on 
pregnancy in these employment practices . . . will go a long 
way toward providing equal employment opportunities for 
women, the goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.72 
Thus, the legislative history of the PDA illustrates congressional 
concern not only with discrimination based on a person’s actual status 
but also discrimination that stems from stereotypes and unfounded 
assumptions. 
Congress’ intent to prohibit misperception discrimination under 
Title VII is further supported by a Senate committee report discussing 
the inclusion of “regarded as” language in the ADA: 
[T]he new definition clarifies the intention to include those 
persons who are discriminated against on the basis of 
handicap, whether or not they are in fact handicapped, just as 
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination on the ground of race, whether or not the 
person discriminated against is in fact a member of a racial 
minority. This subsection [protects] . . . those persons who do 
 
 71. Senn, supra note 6, at 851 (quoting Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(2012))). 
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3, 6–7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4749, 4751, 4754–55 (Comm. on Educ. & Labor). 
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not in fact have the condition which they are perceived as 
having . . . [because they] may be subjected to discrimination 
on the basis of their being regarded as handicapped.73 
Although the committee observed that the ADA’s “regarded as” 
language is consistent with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, it could 
have made this same comparison to Title VII; the antidiscrimination 
language throughout the Civil Rights Act is nearly identical.74 
In short, Congress enacted Title VII with the clear intent of 
eradicating certain forms of discrimination from the workplace. There 
is nothing in the legislative history that suggests Congress intended to 
limit employer liability to only discrimination based on a person’s 
actual religion. To the contrary, the legislative history reflects 
Congress’ goal of eliminating discrimination more broadly whenever a 
protected trait such as religion forms the basis of an adverse 
employment action. Moreover, in considering subsequent 
antidiscrimination legislation, including the PDA and the ADA, 
Congress highlighted the importance of prohibiting all forms of 
invidious discrimination, whether based on a person’s actual or 
perceived characteristics. 
C. EEOC Guidance 
The EEOC’s position on misperception discrimination is critical 
because, although nonbinding, courts often defer to the Commission on 
matters of Title VII interpretation.75 The EEOC has long insisted 
 
 73. S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 17–18 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6373, 6389–90. 
 74. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in 
federally-funded programs and activities based “on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin”), with § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination in employment 
because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), and  
§ 2000e-2(m) (making unlawful any adverse employment action where “race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice”). 
 75. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation”); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) 
(“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under 
[the Fair Labor Standards] Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their 
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 
562 U.S. 170, 179 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (EEOC’s statements in its 
Compliance Manual merit judicial deference as to interpretation of language in Title 
VII). 
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misperception discrimination claims of all types are cognizable under 
Title VII. The federal regulations contain the EEOC’s most detailed 
explanation of its position in the context of national origin 
discrimination: “The Commission defines national origin discrimination 
broadly as including, but not limited to, the denial of equal employment 
opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place 
of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or 
linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.”76 The regulation 
makes clear that a national origin claim need not be based on a person’s 
actual place of origin but can also arise from the misperception that a 
person is of a particular origin because she possesses certain 
characteristics of that national origin group. The regulation further 
explains that the Commission will examine “with particular concern” 
allegations of national origin discrimination based on the perception that 
an individual belongs to a national origin group because of her 
association with persons of a national origin group or organizations that 
promote the interests of a national origin group, participation in 
activities generally associated with persons of a national origin group, 
or because her name is associated with a national origin group.77 
The EEOC is even more explicit about its position on 
misperception discrimination in other commentary. Expounding on the 
federal regulation, the Commission explained that “to have a claim of 
national origin discrimination under Title VII, it is not necessary to 
show that the alleged discriminator knew the particular national origin 
group to which the complainant belonged. . . . [I]t is enough to show 
that the complainant was treated differently than others because of his 
or her foreign accent, appearance or physical characteristics.”78 
 
 76. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2015). One question this regulation and subsequent 
EEOC guidance leaves open is whether the Commission believes that for a 
misperception discrimination claim to be actionable, an employer’s misperception must 
bear some reasonable connection to an individual’s actual characteristics. What if the 
individual does not possess such characteristics and the employer misperceives him as 
belonging to a certain national origin group anyway? More to the point, what if an 
employer believes a Jewish employee is Methodist, even though the employee wears a 
yarmulke, studies the Torah on his lunchbreak, observes Jewish holidays, is unavailable 
to work Friday nights, and even directly tells the employer he is Jewish? Misperceiving 
the employee as Methodist seems unreasonable, but should the employer’s 
unreasonableness negate its liability? Although the EEOC has yet to address this issue, 
it seems doubtful the Commission would construe its own regulations in this way. 
Whether one’s misperception is reasonable seems irrelevant to either intent or harm. 
Nevertheless, the EEOC should consider clarifying this issue in future guidelines. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg. 
85,632, 85,633 (Dec. 29, 1980). 
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Elsewhere the EEOC has asserted that Title VII prohibits discrimination 
“based on the employer’s belief that [an individual] is a member of a 
particular national origin group, for example, discrimination against 
someone perceived as being Arab based on his speech, mannerisms, 
and appearance, regardless of how he identifies himself or whether he 
is, in fact, of Arab ethnicity.”79 
Although most EEOC guidance focuses on perceived national 
origin, the Commission has made clear that its interpretation of Title 
VII applies to other protected traits, including religion. For example, 
the EEOC has cautioned that “[a]t this time, employers and unions 
should be particularly sensitive to potential discrimination or 
harassment against individuals who are - or are perceived to be - 
Muslim, Arab, Afghani, Middle Eastern or South Asian (Pakistani, 
Indian, etc.).”80 In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC provides a 
hypothetical acknowledging the illegality of misperception-based 
religious discrimination: “Thomas, who is Egyptian, alleges that he has 
been harassed by his coworkers about his Arab ethnicity. He also has 
been subjected to derogatory comments about Islam even though he has 
told his coworkers that he is Christian. Thomas’ charge should assert 
both national origin and religious discrimination.”81 In its recent 
guidance on religious garb and grooming, the EEOC provides a second 
hypothetical regarding religious misperception, albeit in a slightly 
different context: 
Adarsh, who wears a turban as part of his Sikh religion, is 
hired to work at the counter in a coffee shop. A few weeks 
after Adarsh begins working, the manager notices that the 
work crew from the construction site near the shop no longer 
comes in for coffee in the mornings. When the manager 
makes inquiries, the crew complains that Adarsh, whom they 
mistakenly believe is Muslim, makes them uncomfortable in 
light of the anniversary of the September 11th attacks. The 
 
 79. Section 13: National Origin Discrimination, EEOC COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL, § 13-II (Dec. 2, 2002) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE MANUAL 2002], 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html. 
 80. Employment Discrimination Based on Religion, Ethnicity, or Country of 
Origin, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/fs-relig_ethnic.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2016); see also EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15-II (2006) [hereinafter 
COMPLIANCE MANUAL 2006], http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf 
(“Discrimination against an individual based on a perception of his or her race violates 
Title VII even if that perception is wrong.”). 
 81. COMPLIANCE MANUAL 2002, supra note 79, at § 13-II. 
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manager tells Adarsh that he will be terminated because the 
coffee shop is losing the construction crew’s business. The 
manager has subjected Adarsh to unlawful religious 
discrimination by taking an adverse action based on customer 
preference not to have a cashier of Adarsh’s perceived 
religion. Adarsh’s termination based on customer preference 
would violate Title VII regardless of whether he was correctly 
or incorrectly perceived as Muslim, Sikh, or any other 
religion.82 
According to this example, an employer not only can be held liable 
for its own misperceptions about a person’s religion but also for taking 
adverse action based on the misperceptions of others. 
D. Other Federal Antidiscrimination Laws 
A final source of interpretive guidance is the broader federal 
antidiscrimination scheme. It is not uncommon for courts to apply the 
analytical framework of one antidiscrimination law to another in light 
of their shared goal of eradicating discrimination from the workplace.83 
Because the ADA is the only federal statute that explicitly prohibits 
“regarded as” discrimination, it is worth considering whether the 
statute’s language should have any bearing on whether Title VII 
similarly prohibits misperception discrimination. On the one hand, 
courts that reject misperception claims under Title VII almost 
universally point to the fact that the ADA contains specific “regarded 
as” language, whereas Title VII does not, as proof that Congress did 
not intend for misperception discrimination to be cognizable under Title 
VII.84 But on the other hand, this difference in the statutory texts does 
not have to be dispositive if courts focus on the similarities between the 
ADA and Title VII in terms of both philosophies and protections. 
 
 82. Religious Garb and Grooming, supra note 53. 
 83. See, e.g., Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting 
that because the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII “all serve the same purpose—to prohibit 
discrimination in employment against members of certain classes. . . . [I]t follows that 
the methods and manner of proof under one statute should inform the standards under 
the others as well”(quoting Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153 (3rd Cir. 
1995)); Kroske v. US Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that 
“the ADEA shares a common purpose with Title VII,” such that its antidiscrimination 
provisions are “modeled upon the prohibitions of Title VII” (citing McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995)). 
 84. See infra Part III.A for analysis of cases so holding. 
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Indeed, courts have repeatedly held that Title VII and the ADA must be 
interpreted consistently in light of their shared purpose.85 
In advocating for the extension of “regarded as” protection under 
Title VII, Professor Craig Robert Senn explains that the ADA, Title 
VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) have 
long shared “an identical congressional and judicial philosophy” that 
“employer perception or stereotype is an appropriate justification for 
imposing employment discrimination liability, even when that 
perception or stereotype is erroneous and inaccurate.”86 He points out 
that when Congress enacted the ADA, it expressed concern about 
“myths, fears and stereotypes,” “generalizations,” “presumptions,” 
“prejudging,” “preconceived and . . . erroneous judgment . . . based 
on labeling,” “negative attitudes,” “misconceptions,” “unfounded, 
outmoded stereotypes and perceptions,” “false presumptions, . . . 
misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and 
pernicious mythologies,” and “stereotypical assumptions.”87 These 
same concerns have surfaced in the ADEA context, where Congress 
and the Supreme Court have discussed age-related “negative 
stereotypes,” “pervasive belief,” “myth,” “wrong[] assum[ptions],” 
“perception,” and “inaccurate and denigrating generalization.”88 In the 
Title VII context, Congress and the Supreme Court have used virtually 
identical terminology (e.g., “assumption,” “view,” “stereotype,” 
“stereotyping,” and “belief”) in expressing discrimination-related 
concerns.89 Professor Senn argues that these interchangeable terms and 
concerns across various federal antidiscrimination statutes evidence a 
“central philosophy” that discrimination based on misperceptions and 
stereotypes is unlawful.90 It therefore follows that “[c]omparable 
perception-based philosophies should translate to comparable 
perception-based protections.”91 
 
 85. EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1038 n.11 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(“Due to the similarities between the ADA and Title VII, we generally interpret those 
statutes consistently.”); EEOC v. Valero Refining-Texas L.P., No. 3:10-CV-398, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42776, at *9 n.3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2013) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit 
interprets the language of the ADA consistently with that of Title VII.”); Gretzula v. 
Camden Cnty. Technical Sch. Bd. of Educ., 965 F. Supp. 2d 478, 488 (D.N.J. 2013) 
(“Title VII and the ADA should be interpreted consistently . . . .”). 
 86. Senn, supra note 6, at 827, 847. 
 87. Id. at 854 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 30, 58 (1990); H.R. 
REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 30 (1990)). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 855. 
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Professors Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Mario Barnes contend 
that “there is nothing that prevents a court from using doctrinal 
analyses and understandings from other antidiscrimination statutes to 
assist in understanding the operation of discriminatory conduct within 
the Title VII context.”92 Given the shared philosophies and purposes of 
Title VII and the ADA, courts regularly rely on doctrinal analyses and 
understandings from Title VII to interpret the ADA. For example, in 
determining whether the ADA permits suits against individual 
defendants, a district court noted that the statute is similar to Title VII 
both in purpose and remedial structure and that the Fifth Circuit had 
required in a separate case that “the language of Title VII and the ADA 
dictates a consistent reading of the two statutes.”93 In considering the 
validity of hostile work environment claims under the ADA, the Tenth 
Circuit likewise relied on the statute’s similarities to Title VII in 
concluding that “nothing indicates that Congress intended  
disability-based employment discrimination to be treated any less 
expansively.”94 
Just as courts have relied on Title VII for guidance in interpreting 
the ADA, so too can they look to the ADA in discerning whether 
misperception discrimination claims are cognizable under Title VII. 
Professors Onwuachi-Willig and Barnes urge that “[t]he turn to the 
‘regarded as’ prong need not be understood as literal, but can be 
encouraged as an intellectual tool to assist the court in answering the 
critical question: ‘How is discrimination working?’”95 Given the 
similarities between the ADA and Title VII, and in particular their 
common goal of eliminating discrimination, it would be inconsistent for 
 
 92. Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 6, at 1328. 
 93. McLennan v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., No. 3:12-CV-00531, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 105858, at *7–8 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2012) (quoting Flowers v. S. Reg’l 
Phys. Serv., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001)). 
 94. Lanman v. Johnson Cnty., 393 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2004); see 
also, e.g., Bristol v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 281 F.3d 1148, 1164 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(concluding that the definition of employer is substantially similar under the ADA and 
Title VII and applying Title VII cases to disability discrimination analysis), vacated in 
part on other grounds by 312 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Brown v. Brody, 
199 F.3d 446, 456 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that “[c]ourts of appeals routinely 
apply the same standards to evaluate Title VII claims as they do ADA claims. . . . ”), 
Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting reasons for 
precluding individual supervisor liability under Title VII apply equally to ADA); 
Gallagher v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 14 F. Supp. 3d 1380, 1386 (S.D. Cal. 
2014) (holding that ADA retaliation claims must be analyzed under same standards as 
Title VII retaliation, “[g]iven the similar use of the ‘because’ of language in both 
[provisions]”). 
 95. Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 6, at 1328. 
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Congress to prohibit discrimination based on misperceptions about an 
employee’s abilities but not an employee’s religion. It is unlikely that 
Congress intended such a result, especially where both types of 
discrimination seem equally intentional and harmful. There is no 
hierarchy of protected statuses under the federal antidiscrimination 
laws: the prohibition against employment discrimination applies equally 
to religion, disability, age, sex, race, and a host of other 
characteristics.96 It therefore follows that courts should interpret Title 
VII and the ADA as consistent in prohibiting misperception-based 
discrimination. 
III. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF MISPERCEPTION DISCRIMINATION 
Misperception discrimination claims are a relatively recent 
phenomenon, with the first case not arising until 1994—a full three 
decades after Title VII’s enactment.97 Although the courts have 
considered this issue more than two dozen times since then, the 
misperception discrimination jurisprudence remains far from settled. 
This is because the vast majority of these cases are decided at the 
district level and thus generally lack the analytical depth or precedential 
weight of appellate cases. Just three federal courts of appeals have 
addressed misperception discrimination under Title VII: the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits allow such claims,98 whereas the Fourth Circuit 
rejects them.99 Two other courts of appeals, the Third and Ninth 
Circuits, have recognized misperception claims under other statutes.100 
 
 96. See James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 
Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2004) (Despite arguable differences 
between religion and other protected statuses under Title VII, “religion’s inclusion [in 
Title VII] enshrined it as something beyond the reach of employers in making relevant 
workplace decisions and, in so doing, equated it with other indisputably immutable 
characteristics, such as race or sex, at least for the purpose of legal protection.”). 
 97. See Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1263–65 
(N.D. Ohio 1994). 
 98. See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1299–300 (11th Cir. 
2012); EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 401–02 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 99. El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., 451 F. App’x 257, 257 (4th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam). 
 100. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571–72 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(endorsing perception theory of retaliation under the ADA); Estate of Amos v. City of 
Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a race-based 
misperception discrimination claim was cognizable under § 1983 because the 
defendant’s “alleged discrimination is no less malevolent because it was based upon an 
erroneous assumption”).  
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Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities101 was the first case 
to address misperception discrimination. Arthur Perkins alleged his 
employer discriminated against him based on his status as a Native 
American.102 The County moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that Perkins was not a member of a protected class because he was not 
actually Native American.103 After engaging in a lengthy analysis of the 
evidence of Perkins’ ancestry, the court determined the question of 
whether Perkins was Native American was too close for summary 
judgment.104 Although Perkins himself never raised the issue of 
misperception discrimination, the court explained that there was “an 
alternative, and perhaps more significant,” reason to deny summary 
judgment that required no proof of Perkins’ ancestry.105 The court 
reasoned that because there was evidence that the County had perceived 
Perkins as Native American based on his physical features, the 
County’s subjective belief that Perkins was Native American—not his 
actual ancestry—controlled whether he was a member of a protected 
class.106 
Without the benefit of any precedent to support its conclusion, the 
court looked instead to Title VII’s purpose and concluded, 
“[C]onsistent with the intent of Title VII, when racial discrimination is 
involved perception and appearance are everything. As with the joy of 
beauty, the ugliness of bias can be in the eye of the beholder.”107 The 
court thought it “unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, to attempt to 
measure [Perkins’] percentage of Indian blood or to examine his 
documentable connection to recognized existing tribes.”108 The court 
further reasoned that “[e]mployers do not discriminate on the basis of 
such factors;” instead, “[o]bjective appearance and employer 
perception” are the most relevant factors in determining whether 
unlawful discrimination occurred.109 In so holding, the court seemed 
disinterested in Title VII’s precise wording, opting instead to take a 
more pragmatic approach that emphasized how, in the context of 
discrimination, perception is reality. 
 
 101. 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 
 102. Id. at 1263–64. 
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 104. Id. at 1266–77. 
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 107. Id. at 1277–78. 
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Despite its importance as the first case to consider misperception 
discrimination, Perkins has failed to gain much traction with other 
courts.110 Two opposing lines of cases have since emerged, with almost 
no middle ground between them. As the following analysis indicates, 
courts that reject misperception claims interpret Title VII as permitting 
only discrimination claims based on an individual’s actual religion or 
other protected characteristic, absent a congressional amendment 
comparable to the ADA’s “regarded as” provision. By contrast, courts 
that recognize such claims tend to take a more expansive view, focusing 
on Title VII’s purpose and EEOC guidance. Although most of the key 
misperception discrimination cases involve race or national origin 
claims, courts have applied the reasoning from such cases to 
misperception-based religious discrimination claims as well.111 
A. Key Cases Rejecting Misperception Discrimination 
The most influential case rejecting a misperception discrimination 
claim is Butler v. Potter.112 Jesse Butler brought suit against his former 
employer, the U.S. Postal Service, alleging discrimination based on his 
perceived race and national origin.113 Butler claimed a supervisor 
screamed obscenities at him and accused him of being Indian or Middle 
Eastern, even though he identified as a “white Caucasian.”114 The 
district court dismissed Butler’s claim on summary judgment, reasoning 
that Title VII only protects employees belonging to a protected class 
and “says nothing about protection of persons who are perceived to 
belong to a protected class.”115 In what has subsequently become the 
most oft-cited language from the decision, the court further explained 
that “Congress has shown, through the Rehabilitation Act, and the 
 
 110. In fact, only two courts have even referenced Perkins in deciding the 
validity of Title VII misperception claims. Both courts found Perkins persuasive and 
followed its holding. See Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., Inc., No.  
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Contractors, No. 02:07cv1464, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72551, at *14–16 (W.D. Pa. 
Sept. 24, 2008); Berrios v. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 02-3124, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101366, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007). 
 112. 345 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 113. Id. at 847–48. 
 114. Id. at 846. 
 115. Id. at 850. 
 112 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
Americans with Disabilities Act that it knows how to enact legislation 
that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected 
class.”116 Implicit, of course, in the court’s observation was the 
assumption that Congress deliberately chose not to include “regarded 
as” language in Title VII because it did not want to allow misperception 
discrimination claims. Curiously, the court claimed to be unaware of 
any contrary authority that would allow Butler’s claim to survive 
summary judgment.117 It is peculiar that the court would not at least 
acknowledge Perkins, which, although not controlling per se, was 
decided just ten years earlier by a district court within the same circuit. 
Two years later, Uddin v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp.118 
presented facts similar to those at issue in Butler. Zaheer Uddin 
claimed he was harassed and eventually terminated because his 
coworkers misperceived him as Middle Eastern, when in reality he was 
from India.119 Uddin alleged his coworkers asked him, “What’s going 
on with your cousin in Afghanistan?” (in reference to Osama bin 
Laden) and “Can you marry four wives?” and commented that “a 
Middle-Easterner like [Uddin] would never make it through airport 
security while carrying a particular product prototype.”120 In dismissing 
Uddin’s perceived national origin claim, the court cited Butler for the 
proposition that “Title VII does not explicitly protect persons who are 
perceived to belong to a protected class.”121 The court did not discuss 
whether Title VII implicitly protects victims of misperception 
discrimination. Like in Butler, the court claimed to be unaware of any 
precedent to the contrary, again ignoring the Perkins decision.122 
In Lewis v. North General Hospital,123 the district court built off 
the Butler analysis in even more forcefully rejecting a misperception 
claim.124 Darren Lewis claimed his coworkers wrongly perceived him 
as Muslim after he temporarily changed his name to Serh Talmadge 
Farid Efe.125 He believed this misperception led to rumors he was a 
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“child molester,” “not an American,” “homophobic,” and “racist.”126 
In granting the hospital summary judgment, the court first determined 
that Lewis had not articulated a factual basis for his perceived-religion 
claim.127 Although it could have ended its analysis there, the court 
further asserted that “the protections of Title VII do not extend to 
persons who are merely ‘perceived’ to belong to a protected class.”128 
The court then made explicit what Butler left implicit: “If Congress had 
wanted to permit a similar cause of action under Title VII for 
‘perceived religion’ discrimination, it could have so provided. It did 
not.”129 
The only appellate case rejecting a misperception discrimination 
claim is El v. Max Daetwyler Corp.130 Darryl El alleged he was 
terminated because his employer misperceived him as a Muslim, when 
in reality he was a Universalist.131 The district court dismissed El’s 
claim based on the absence of “regarded as” language in Title VII.132 
The Fourth Circuit upheld the decision on appeal, explaining in a  
four-sentence opinion that it found “no reversible error” in the record 
and “affirm[ed] for the reasons stated by the district court.”133 Thus, 
the Fourth Circuit declined to expound on the district court’s reasoning 
and consequently missed an opportunity to provide much-needed 
appellate analysis of why Title VII precludes misperception 
discrimination claims. 
The Butler, Uddin, and Lewis decisions, together with the 
appellate authority of El, have provided like-minded courts with all the 
authority they feel is necessary to deny misperception claims. Since 
Lewis was decided in 2007, seven other courts have declined to 
recognize misperception discrimination claims under Title VII.134 
 
 126. Id. at 394–95. 
 127. Id. at 401. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 451 F. App’x 257 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 131. El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 3:09cv415, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
49645, at *1 (W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011). 
 132. Id. at *12–15. 
 133. El, 451 F. App’x at 258. 
 134. See Sears v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-1322, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
58148, at *21 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 25, 2014); Yousif v. Landers McClarty Olathe KS, 
LLC, No. 12-2788-CM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154504, at *9–10 (D. Kan. Oct. 28, 
2013); Guthrey v. Calif. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:10-cv-02177-AWI-BAM, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89174, at *16 n.2 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2012); Burrage v. 
FedEx Freight, Inc., No. 4:10CV2755, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43365, at *13–14 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012); El, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49645, at *12–15; Adler v. 
 
 114 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
Without exception, each court relied on Butler’s narrow interpretation 
of Title VII’s text.135 While it is certainly understandable that these 
courts would cite to other cases reaching their same conclusion, what is 
surprising is that not one has acknowledged that several courts have 
reached the opposite conclusion. Some courts have even gone so far as 
to claim to be unaware of any authority that would allow a 
misperception discrimination claim.136 Consequently, these courts have 
made no effort to reconcile their position with the opposing line of 
cases. 
Likewise, these courts have yet to acknowledge, much less 
resolve, the ambiguity resulting from the 1991 amendment to Title VII. 
While it is true that § 2000e-2(a)(1) could be read in isolation as 
prohibiting only discrimination based on a person’s actual religion,137 it 
is equally true that, standing alone, subsection (m) suggests religious 
misperception claims are cognizable when religion in general motivates 
an adverse employment action.138 Although courts must attempt to read 
a statute in a manner that harmonizes its provisions and avoids 
ambiguity,139 there has been no such effort by courts rejecting 
misperception discrimination claims,140 and just one court recognizing 
such claims has attempted to do so.141 
 
Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 07 C 4203, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744, at 
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Furthermore, although the EEOC has been outspoken in 
acknowledging misperception discrimination, these courts pay almost 
no attention to the EEOC’s position. In fact, just one court has even 
acknowledged the federal regulations or other EEOC materials in 
support of misperception discrimination. In Yousif v. Landers McClarty 
Olathe KS, LLC,142 the plaintiff cited to and attached the EEOC 
Compliance Manual and an EEOC fact sheet in support of his claim of 
misperception discrimination.143 The court made short work of these 
documents, deeming them “unpersuasive here and not entitled to any 
special deference, especially when the explicit language in Title VII and 
clear case law stand for the opposite proposition.”144 
Perhaps most perplexing is these courts’ seeming disregard for 
how their interpretation of Title VII undermines the statute’s goal of 
ending discrimination in the workplace. None of these courts 
acknowledge how their interpretation of Title VII disadvantages victims 
of misperception discrimination, who are denied their day in court 
simply because their employers were mistaken about their religious 
beliefs. Nor do any of the courts concede that their construal of Title 
VII permits employers to discriminate, so long as their perception of an 
individual’s religion is inaccurate. Instead, they appear content to 
mechanically apply Butler to reach a conclusion that seems at odds with 
Title VII’s express goals. 
Rigid adherence to such a narrow interpretation of § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
seems curious in light of subsection (m), EEOC guidance, and Title 
VII’s overarching purpose. One possible reason for this is because of 
how courts tend to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework to disparate-treatment claims where there is no direct 
evidence of discrimination. The Supreme Court established this 
framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,145 a case involving a 
claim that the employer refused to hire the plaintiff because he was 
black.146 The Court explained that in order to prevail on such a claim, 
Green initially had to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by 
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showing (1) he belonged to a racial minority, (2) he applied and was 
qualified for the position, (3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected, 
and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applications from persons with Green’s same 
qualifications.147 The burden then would shift to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting Green’s 
application, and Green would thereafter bear the burden of showing the 
employer’s reason was a pretext for discrimination.148 Out of necessity, 
courts occasionally modify certain elements of the prima facie case to 
adapt to different forms of disparate treatment; yet the one element that 
has remained constant is the requirement that a plaintiff belong to a 
protected class.149 As Professor Wendy Greene points out, courts that 
reject misperception discrimination claims appear to be engaging in a 
literal application of the protected class element of the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
cautioned that the elements of the prima facie case were never intended 
to be applied in formulaic fashion.150 She argues that the protected class 
element may simply have been the manifestation of the facts at issue in 
McDonnell Douglas.151 Professor Greene also contends that when 
articulating the membership prong, perhaps “the Supreme Court did not 
contemplate that a Title VII discrimination plaintiff’s allegations of 
invidious, differential treatment may not comport with [one’s]  
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self-ascribed identity.”152 She further suggests that the membership 
prong “may have also been a function of the lack of clarity at the time 
concerning whether Title VII was solely meant to redress 
discrimination against nonwhites, or if all individuals regardless of their 
classification would be protected against discrimination.”153 
In short, courts that reject misperception discrimination claims 
almost exclusively rely on the fact that Congress has not amended Title 
VII to include “regarded as” language to justify their position. Their 
disinclination to address the line of cases permitting misperception 
claims, reconcile their interpretation of § 2000e-2(a)(1) with subsection 
(m), consider the EEOC’s guidance, or acknowledge the difficulty of 
their position in light of Title VII’s express purpose may stem from a 
narrow interpretation of subsection (a)(1) in isolation, as well as strict 
adherence to the membership prong of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework. Both rationales seem tenuous at best. 
B. Key Cases Recognizing Misperception Discrimination 
Unlike cases rejecting misperception discrimination claims, courts 
that recognize such claims benefit from substantive appellate decisions 
to guide their analyses. The first appellate case to directly address 
misperception discrimination under Title VII was EEOC v. WC&M 
Enterprises, Inc.154 Mohommed Rafiq was born in India and was a 
practicing Muslim.155 As with the plaintiffs in Butler and Uddin, Rafiq 
alleged his coworkers misperceived him as Middle Eastern.156 
Following the September 11 attacks, Rafiq’s coworkers allegedly 
implied he was a terrorist, began calling him “Taliban,” and often 
referred to him as an “Arab.”157 Like in Butler, the district court 
dismissed Rafiq’s perceived national origin claim because none of the 
alleged harassment related to the fact he was Indian.158 The Fifth 
Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s assessment, holding “a party is 
able to establish a discrimination claim based on its own national origin 
even though the discriminatory acts do not identify the victim’s actual 
country of origin.”159 The Fifth Circuit considered the EEOC’s 
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guidance, noting that the Commission had defined national origin 
discrimination “broadly” in the federal regulations to include 
discrimination undertaken because an individual possesses the 
characteristics of a national origin group.160 The court further observed 
that the EEOC had elsewhere explained that a national origin 
discrimination claim does not require proof that the discriminator had 
actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s national origin; “it is enough to 
show that the complainant was treated differently because of his or her 
foreign accent, appearance, or physical characteristics.”161 Based on 
this guidance, the court concluded Rafiq’s country of origin was 
irrelevant; the employer’s misperception that he was Middle Eastern 
was sufficient to allow his claim to survive.162 
The Eleventh Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Jones v. UPS Ground Freight.163 One of the key issues on appeal was 
whether the trier of fact could take into account a misperception-based 
racial slur in determining whether Reginald Jones endured a hostile 
work environment.164 Jones alleged that while on a training run a 
coworker told him, “I know how to train you Indians.”165 When Jones 
responded that he was not Native American, the coworker allegedly 
replied, “I don’t care what race you are, I trained your kind before.”166 
Citing WC&M Enterprises, the court held that “a harasser’s use of 
epithets associated with a different ethnic or racial minority than the 
plaintiff will not necessarily shield an employer from liability for a 
hostile work environment.”167 The court did not analyze the 
reasonableness of the coworker’s misperception other than to note in 
passing that perhaps the slur was directed at Jones “based on his dark 
complection [sic] or some other perceived shared characteristic with 
Native Americans.”168 
Ironically, perhaps the appellate case that courts cite most often in 
recognizing misperception discrimination under Title VII actually 
involved an ADA retaliation claim. In Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, 
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Inc.,169 Greg Fogleman alleged he was fired because his employer 
mistakenly believed he was assisting his father in a separate lawsuit 
against the hospital.170 The district court dismissed the claim, 
concluding the ADA did not support a perception theory of 
retaliation.171 The Third Circuit disagreed, explaining that the law 
focuses on an employer’s subjective reasons for discriminating against 
an employee, “so it matters not whether the reasons behind the 
employer’s discriminatory animus are actually correct as a factual 
matter.”172 It then provided an analogy that subsequent courts often 
reference in recognizing misperception claims in the Title VII 
context:173 
[I]magine a Title VII discrimination case in which an 
employer refuses to hire a prospective employee because he 
thinks that the applicant is a Muslim. The employer is still 
discriminating on the basis of religion even if the applicant he 
refuses to hire is not in fact a Muslim. What is relevant is that 
the applicant, whether Muslim or not, was treated worse than 
he otherwise would have been for reasons prohibited by the 
statute.174 
This analogy makes clear that, like the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 
the Third Circuit reads Title VII as permitting claims of misperception 
discrimination.175 The court seemed unconcerned with the accuracy of 
the hypothetical employer’s perception of the individual’s religion. 
Instead, the relevant inquiry was whether the individual was “treated 
worse” because of religion more generally.176 
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A final appellate decision that also has proven influential is Estate 
of Amos v. City of Page, Arizona.177 Like Fogleman, the case is 
significant even though it does not involve a Title VII claim. Burton 
Amos was involved in an automobile accident near Page, Arizona, and 
subsequently fled the scene and disappeared into the desert.178 Despite 
discovering blood inside Amos’ vehicle and tracks leading into the 
desert that evidenced a person possibly in distress, the responding 
officers cut short their search when their flashlights lost power.179 After 
Amos’ remains were discovered nearly a year later, his estate brought 
suit against the City, alleging it had violated Amos’ due process and 
equal protection rights by conducting an insufficient search.180 The 
estate argued that the City failed to effectively search for Amos because 
it misperceived him as Native American, when in reality he was 
white.181 Because Page is a border town surrounded by the Navajo 
Reservation, it is apparently common for Native Americans involved in 
car accidents to leave the scene, abscond into the desert, and call the 
police the next day to report their vehicle as stolen.182 In reversing 
summary judgment for the City, the Ninth Circuit held that 
misperception discrimination claims are cognizable under the Equal 
Protection Clause.183 The court pointed out that the City’s 
misperception of Amos as Native American “does not make that 
discrimination or its resulting injury less direct,” nor was it “less 
malevolent because it was based upon an erroneous assumption.”184 The 
court concluded, “Amos should be viewed as . . . the police officers 
viewed him: as a Native American.”185 Thus, like the Perkins and 
Fogleman courts, the Ninth Circuit focused on the defendant’s 
subjective belief rather than Amos’ actual race. 
With the backing of four courts of appeals, like-minded district 
courts are outspoken about what they view as the injustices of denying 
misperception claims, characterizing the contrary position as 
“superficially logical, but fundamentally abhorrent,”186 “as offensive as 
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it is incorrect,”187 and “objectively unreasonable.”188 One court 
remarked that “[t]he fact that [the defendant] ignorantly used the wrong 
derogatory ethnic remark toward the plaintiff is inconsequential.”189 
According to another court, “Plaintiffs do not lose the protection of 
discrimination laws because they are discriminated against for the 
wrong reasons.”190 Another court reasoned that permitting an employer 
to escape liability simply because of misperception “would allow 
prohibited discrimination to go unredressed on the basis of an error in 
no way diminishing the harm to the victim of the discrimination.”191 
Aside from these broader policy arguments, courts have also 
addressed the textual argument relied upon by Butler and its progeny. 
For instance, in Arsham v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,192 the 
court voiced surprise that district courts have rejected misperception 
claims based on the text of Title VII, reasoning that “Congress may not 
have thought it necessary to revise Title VII to conform to the wording 
of the ADA if it was aware of the EEOC’s . . . long-standing 
interpretation of Title VII.”193 The court found the EEOC guidance to 
be consistent with § 2000e-2(m).194 According to the court, subsection 
(a)(1), which prohibits discrimination based on “such person’s . . . 
religion,” must be read together with subsection (m), which prohibits 
discrimination where religion (or some other protected trait) motivates 
an adverse employment decision.195 “Doing so,” the court explained, 
“allows the conclusion that Congress did not intend to cabin Title VII’s 
prohibition of invidious discrimination such that some forms of 
discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics are permissible. 
The narrow reading of section a . . . is inconsistent with Title VII’s 
purpose . . . .”196 
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Although most reported cases recognizing misperception 
discrimination involve race or national origin claims, three courts have 
specifically addressed misperception-based religious discrimination. In 
Berrios v. Hampton Bays Union Free School District,197 Lauren Berrios 
alleged she was terminated from her teaching position because her 
employer mistakenly believed she was a Wiccan.198 She alternatively 
claimed she was fired because of her actual religion, which is Jewish.199 
Before sending the case to the jury, the court entered an order noting 
that Title VII does not expressly recognize misperception discrimination 
and that two district courts had rejected such claims.200 But the court 
did not feel comfortable dismissing the claim and instead advised it 
would instruct the jury on both the perceived and actual religious 
discrimination claims, so that if the jury found in favor of Berrios on 
the misperception claim, the finding would be clear and could be 
appealed.201 In essence, the court was unsure how to rule on the 
misperception discrimination claim, so it set up the jury instructions in 
a way that would allow the Second Circuit to decide the issue.202 
In Smith v. Specialty Pool Contractors,203 Robert Smith alleged he 
was harassed based on a supervisor’s misperception that he was 
Jewish.204 Even though Smith was Catholic, the supervisor allegedly 
insisted he was Jewish and repeatedly called him “Hebrew,” 
“Abraham,” “Jew Boy,” and “Kike.”205 The supervisor also allegedly 
told Smith that “Hitler did not do a good enough job because you . . . 
are still alive.”206 The court denied the employer’s summary judgment 
motion, despite acknowledging that neither the Supreme Court nor the 
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Third Circuit had decided the issue of misperception discrimination.207 
The court found persuasive the Third Circuit’s analogy in Fogelman.208 
After quoting the entire analogy, the court concluded that a reasonable 
jury could find that the employer discriminated against Smith based on 
the mistaken belief that he practiced Judaism.209 
The most recent case to consider a religious misperception claim 
was Kallabat v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.210 Basil Kallabat, an 
Iraqi, claimed his coworkers harassed him because they mistakenly 
believed he was Muslim.211 According to Kallabat, his coworkers 
ridiculed him for wearing his hat backward, remarking that it looked 
like a “topi” (a skullcap worn by Muslim men for religious reasons).212 
There was also graffiti in the restroom showing what appeared to be the 
World Trade Center with a plane crashing into it, with a caption stating 
that Kallabat was learning how to fly.213 In rejecting the employer’s 
argument that misperception claims are not cognizable under Title VII, 
the court acknowledged the line of cases invalidating such claims but 
noted the issue remained undecided in the Sixth Circuit.214 Like in 
Smith, the court found persuasive the Fogelman analogy, concluding 
that a reasonable jury could find that Kallabat was discriminated against 
based on the misperception he was Muslim.215 
In short, courts that recognize misperception discrimination tend to 
focus on Title VII’s overarching purpose rather than any single 
provision of the statutory text. These courts emphasize the unfairness of 
allowing an employer to escape liability for discrimination simply 
because the employer is mistaken about the victim’s religion (or other 
protected trait). In addition to this policy rationale, these courts have 
also relied on the text of Title VII and EEOC guidance to support their 
position. 
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IV. MISPERCEPTION DISCRIMINATION AFTER ABERCROMBIE 
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether 
misperception discrimination claims are cognizable under Title VII, its 
recent decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. may 
ultimately put this issue to rest. This Part analyzes Abercrombie and 
explains how the decision requires courts to recognize  
misperception-based religious discrimination claims going forward. 
A. The Abercrombie Decision 
Abercrombie & Fitch is a clothing retailer that is known for being 
highly image conscious.216 The company maintains a Look Policy to 
ensure its employees properly and consistently model Abercrombie’s 
brands.217 This policy prohibits “caps” because Abercrombie considers 
them too informal.218 Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim who wears a 
headscarf in accordance with her religious tenets, applied for a position 
at an Abercrombie store.219 The store’s assistant manager interviewed 
Elauf and rated her as qualified to be hired.220 The interviewer did not 
ask Elauf why she wore the headscarf, nor did Elauf volunteer that 
information.221 The assistant manager was unsure whether Elauf’s 
headscarf would violate the Look Policy, so she consulted with her 
district manager.222 Although the assistant manager did not know for 
certain that Elauf was Muslim, she told the district manager that she 
thought Elauf wore the headscarf because of her religious beliefs.223 
The district manager then instructed her not to hire Elauf because her 
headscarf would violate the Look Policy.224 
The EEOC brought suit on Elauf’s behalf, alleging Abercrombie’s 
refusal to hire (and accommodate) Elauf violated Title VII.225 The 
district court granted the EEOC summary judgment as to liability.226 
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The Tenth Circuit reversed and awarded Abercrombie summary 
judgment, holding that the defendant could not be liable for denying a 
religious accommodation because Elauf did not provide the company 
with actual knowledge that she would need an accommodation.227 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Title VII’s 
prohibition against religious discrimination “applies only where an 
applicant has informed the employer of his need for an 
accommodation.”228 
In an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court held that an 
applicant or employee need only show that her need for an 
accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse 
employment action, not that the employer had knowledge of her 
need.229 While this holding is remarkable in its own right, the Court’s 
underlying rationale is equally significant. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Scalia first explained that Title VII prohibits two kinds of 
discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.230 He then 
noted that Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision prohibits employers 
from failing to hire an applicant “because of such individual’s . . . 
religion.”231 The parties did not dispute that Abercrombie failed to hire 
Elauf, so the only question before the Court was whether Elauf was not 
hired “because of” her religious practice.232 Justice Scalia observed that 
although the “because of” language in § 2000e-2(a)(1) would ordinarily 
require but-for causation, “Title VII relaxes this standard” because 
subsection (m) prohibits even making a protected characteristic a 
“motivating factor” in an adverse employment action.233 
In what will surely become the most critical line from the decision, 
Justice Scalia subsequently explained that “[i]t is significant that  
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) does not impose a knowledge requirement.”234 Unlike 
the ADA, which only requires accommodation of “known physical or 
mental limitations,” Title VII does not mandate that an employer 
accommodate only known religious practices.235 “Instead, the 
intentional discrimination provision prohibits certain motives, regardless 
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of the state of the actor’s knowledge.”236 According to Justice Scalia, 
“[m]otive and knowledge are separate concepts.”237 An employer with 
knowledge of an applicant’s religious practices would not be liable for 
refusing to hire the applicant so long as avoiding the accommodation is 
not the employer’s motive, but “an employer who acts with the motive 
of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no 
more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be 
needed.”238 
Based on this reasoning, the Court pronounced what it considered 
a “straightforward” rule: “An employer may not make an applicant’s 
religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment 
decisions.”239 In announcing this rule, the Court rejected the notion that 
an applicant must inform the potential employer of her need for a 
religious accommodation, reiterating that Title VII’s  
“disparate-treatment provision prohibits actions taken with the motive 
of avoiding the need for accommodating a religious practice. A request 
for an accommodation, or the employer’s certainty that the practice 
exists, may make it easier to infer motive, but is not a necessary 
condition of liability.”240 Thus, even if an employer has no actual 
knowledge that an applicant would need a religious accommodation, as 
long as the employer subjectively believes this to be the case and 
refuses to hire the applicant based on its belief, the employer has 
violated Title VII. 
In his concurrence, Justice Alito took issue with the Court’s 
declaration that Title VII does not impose a knowledge requirement.241 
He reasoned that if there truly were no knowledge requirement, 
Abercrombie could be held liable even if the interviewer thought Elauf 
was wearing the headscarf for purely secular reasons.242 According to 
Justice Alito, such an interpretation is “surely wrong.”243 In his view, 
the Court should have determined “that an employer cannot be held 
liable for taking an adverse action because of an employee’s religious 
practice unless the employer knows that the employee engages in the 
practice for a religious reason.”244 The majority opinion only briefly 
 
 236. Id. at 2033. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. at 2035 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 242. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
 243. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
 244. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
 2016:87 Misperception-Based Religious Discrimination 127 
 
responds to this argument, asserting that “[w]hile a knowledge 
requirement cannot be added to the motive requirement, it is arguable 
that the motive requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least 
suspects that the practice in question is a religious practice.”245 The 
Court chose not to further explore this point, explaining that because 
the issue was not presented in this case, “[i]t seems to us inappropriate 
to resolve this unargued point by way of dictum, as the concurrence 
would do.”246 
B. Abercrombie’s Application to Misperception Discrimination 
Although Abercrombie involved a religious accommodation claim, 
its holding is directly applicable to other forms of disparate treatment. 
Indeed, the Court made clear that failing to accommodate an 
employee’s religious practices is a form of disparate treatment, noting 
that in this case, “[f]ailing to hire . . . is synonymous with refusing to 
accommodate the religious practice.”247 It likewise rejected 
Abercrombie’s alternative contention that “a claim based on a failure to 
accommodate an applicant’s religious practices must be raised as a 
disparate-impact claim, not a disparate-treatment claim.”248 Because an 
employer’s failure to accommodate is a form of disparate treatment, 
there is no reason Abercrombie should not apply with equal force to 
other forms of disparate treatment where misperception discrimination 
may be even more likely to arise. 
Abercrombie likewise is no less applicable because the case did not 
involve employer misperception about the applicant’s religion. 
Although the assistant manager correctly guessed that Elauf wore a 
headscarf for religious reasons, the Court seemed uninterested in this 
fact.249 If the assistant manager had been incorrect in her assumption 
about why Elauf wore a headscarf, the outcome of the case almost 
certainly would have remained unchanged, as the Court’s central 
holding—that Title VII does not impose a knowledge requirement—
suggests that what an employer does or does not know about an 
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individual’s religion is irrelevant to whether it can be held liable for 
religious discrimination. 
The Court made clear that an employer’s motive, not its actual 
knowledge, is the gravamen of a disparate-treatment claim. Even 
though Elauf did not provide Abercrombie with actual knowledge of 
her need for an accommodation, the fact that Abercrombie suspected—
substantiated or not—that Elauf might need an accommodation and 
refused to hire her on that basis was enough to hold the defendant 
liable. Just as the Supreme Court refused to allow Abercrombie to hide 
behind its lack of actual knowledge about Elauf’s religious practices, by 
extension courts must also refrain from giving employers a free pass to 
discriminate based on their misperception (i.e., lack of knowledge) 
about an individual’s religion. Because it is motive, not knowledge, that 
matters, the focus in religious discrimination cases going forward must 
be on whether religion—actual or perceived—motivated an adverse 
employment decision. 
Critics of this view may point to two passages in the majority 
opinion that could potentially be misconstrued as requiring a religious 
discrimination claim to be based on an employee’s actual religion. 
First, in deciphering the “because of” language of § 2000e-2(a)(1), the 
Court observed that “an individual’s actual religious practice may not 
be a motivating factor in failing to hire, in refusing to hire, and so 
on.”250 Second, after announcing the rule that an employer cannot make 
an applicant’s religion, “confirmed or otherwise,” a factor in 
employment decisions, the Court gave the example of an employer that 
suspects an applicant is Jewish and thus could not work on Saturdays.251 
The Court explained that “[i]f the applicant actually requires an 
accommodation of that religious practice, and the employer’s desire to 
avoid the prospective accommodation is a motivating factor in his 
decision, the employer violates Title VII.”252 Although both passages 
refer to a person’s “actual” religious practices, the Court does not 
condition liability on this basis. These references are likely a reflection 
of the Court’s sensitivity toward only deciding the issues before it based 
on the precise facts of the case. Lurking in the background of the case 
is the reality that Elauf actually would have needed an accommodation, 
so it is understandable that the Court would frame its analysis to be 
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consistent with that fact.253 Moreover, the decision focuses almost 
exclusively on Abercrombie’s motivation for denying Elauf 
employment and makes almost no mention of Elauf’s actual religious 
practices. If Elauf’s actual religion had been vital to the outcome of the 
case, the Court almost certainly would have placed greater emphasis on 
such a crucial fact. 
In actuality, the application of Abercrombie to misperception cases 
falls squarely in line with the recent shift in employment discrimination 
jurisprudence from an antisubordination to an anticlassification 
orientation.254 Anticlassification values prohibit practices that “classify 
people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden 
category.”255 Whereas the antisubordination principle emphasizes 
broad, group-based subordination that enforces the inferior social status 
of historically oppressed groups, “the anticlassification principle 
reflects a narrower objective of eliminating individual unfairness.”256 
Such unfairness stems, in part, from an employer’s immoral belief that 
“some types of people are morally worthier than others.”257 Hence, 
when a person is judged to be of lesser moral worth and is treated 
accordingly, that treatment is morally wrong regardless of its effects or 
whether the judgment was indeed accurate.258 From an 
anticlassificationist view, applying Abercrombie to misperception 
discrimination claims is logical, and in fact necessary, because it holds 
employers accountable for making immoral judgments about an 
individual’s worth based on religion—a characteristic that correlates so 
weakly with job performance that Congress has forbidden employers 
from almost ever considering it. 
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After Abercrombie, it would be improper for a court to dismiss a 
religious discrimination claim based on an employer’s misperception of 
an employee’s religion, when the Supreme Court has declared that an 
employer’s motive—not its knowledge—determines liability. In light of 
the Supreme Court’s decree that Title VII does not impose an “actual 
knowledge” requirement,259 it seems illogical that an employer could 
escape liability simply because it was mistaken about an individual’s 
religious beliefs. Furthermore, if an employer’s motivation is what 
matters, courts cannot ignore the fact that an employer’s motivation for 
discriminating against an employee is just as intentional and malevolent 
in perceived-religion cases as it is in conventional discrimination 
cases.260 After Abercrombie, courts cannot allow an employer’s 
knowledge, or lack thereof, to trump its motivation. Whether Ashley is 
Catholic or Mormon is neither here nor there; what matters is that 
religion motivated the principal’s adverse employment decision. The 
principal’s action violated Title VII before, and especially after, 
Abercrombie. 
V. THE FUTURE OF MISPERCEPTION DISCRIMINATION 
Up until now, there has been considerable disagreement among the 
courts as to the validity of misperception discrimination claims under 
Title VII. Courts that reject such claims focus almost exclusively on the 
absence of “regarded as” language from the text of Title VII to support 
their position. But the lack of such language hardly settles the question; 
the statutory text itself is susceptible to multiple interpretations, and the 
legislative record, EEOC guidance, and the broader federal 
antidiscrimination scheme favor recognition of such claims. In 
Abercrombie, the Supreme Court emphatically declared that an 
employer’s actual knowledge of an employee’s religious practices is 
irrelevant to Title VII liability. Instead, it is the employer’s motive that 
matters. The implication of this holding for misperception 
discrimination claims is clear: an employer is liable if religion (or 
another protected trait) motivates an adverse employment decision, 
regardless of whether the employer has actual knowledge of the 
individual’s religion. 
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The most significant ramification of the Court’s holding is that 
victims of misperception discrimination are now assured their day in 
court, as the viability of their claims no longer hinges on whether the 
employer perceived their religion correctly. Victims of misperception 
discrimination are no longer second-class plaintiffs, whose claims are 
somehow less worthy of adjudication. By treating misperception 
discrimination claims like conventional discrimination claims, courts 
acknowledge that the harm individuals suffer is no less valid or worthy 
of reparation simply because an employer is mistaken about their 
religious beliefs. In Ashley’s case, the injury she suffered (being passed 
over for the teaching position because the principal mistakenly believed 
she was Mormon) is not somehow less damaging because she is 
actually Catholic. Whether Mormon or Catholic, Ashley was the victim 
of religious discrimination and deserves to be compensated accordingly. 
A second important implication of the Abercrombie decision is that 
employers can no longer escape liability for religious discrimination 
simply by pleading ignorance. The holding sends a clear message to 
employers that discrimination based on stereotypes and unfounded 
assumptions about an employee’s religion will not be tolerated. If 
religion in any way motivates an employment decision, an employer 
can and will be held liable. Moreover, removing this escape hatch may 
motivate employers to better familiarize themselves with an employee’s 
religious beliefs when necessary. This can help break down stereotypes, 
promote greater tolerance and understanding, and reduce the risk of an 
employer making unfair and erroneous assumptions about an 
employee’s religion. 
Third, by recognizing misperception discrimination claims, courts 
appropriately shift the focus away from identity adjudication and onto 
the employer’s motive. If the validity of a religious discrimination 
claim were dependent upon the employer correctly perceiving the 
employee’s religion, an employer could defeat the claim simply by 
showing the employee was not a member of the religion to which the 
employer thought she belonged. This could lead to personal and 
invasive inquiry into an employee’s religious beliefs, which courts have 
consistently maintained falls outside their realm of expertise in most 
cases.261 Abercrombie renders a person’s actual religion irrelevant, thus 
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eliminating the need to scrutinize a plaintiff’s religious beliefs. This 
frees up courts to focus on an employer’s motivations, which the 
Supreme Court has made clear is the touchstone of Title VII liability. It 
likewise acknowledges what the Perkins court first observed more than 
two decades ago: in the context of discrimination, an employer’s 
perception is very much its reality.262 
Fourth, Abercrombie’s reach is not limited only to  
misperception-based religious discrimination. Misperception 
discrimination based on race, color, sex, and national origin is likewise 
prohibited. Just as religious identity is becoming more complex, so, 
too, are these other protected categories, due to “increased 
immigration, cultural diversity, interracial marriages, and transracial 
adoptions, as well as more formal recognition of mixed-race 
classifications and more fluid conceptualizations of gender, racial, and 
cultural identity.”263 After Abercrombie, individuals who are 
misperceived as belonging to a particular race, national origin, or sex 
are assured the same protections under Title VII as are victims of 
conventional discrimination. 
Finally, fully recognizing misperception discrimination claims will 
move us closer to reaching Title VII’s goal of eradicating unlawful 
workplace discrimination. In prohibiting discrimination based on a 
person’s race, sex, religion, or national origin, Congress declared these 
categories largely irrelevant to whether an individual is qualified for 
employment.264 To eliminate employment decisions based on these 
traits, it is not enough merely to ban discrimination based on an 
individual’s actual characteristics. Instead, Title VII must prohibit 
employers from using any of these protected characteristics as a basis 
for discrimination, regardless of whether the victim actually possesses 
the trait in question. Closing the misperception loophole will ensure 
employers are held liable whenever religion or any other protected trait 
motivates an adverse employment action. 
 
been accepted on little more than the plaintiff’s credible assertions.” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 262. See Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1277–78 
(N.D. Ohio 1994). 
 263. Greene, supra note 6, at 101. 
 264. But see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of 
. . . religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or 
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States is in the midst of unprecedented religious 
diversification. There are more religions and greater diversity of 
religious expression than ever before. This remarkable shift in the 
religious landscape increases the possibility of discrimination based on 
misperceptions about an employee’s religion. Consequently, it is more 
important than ever that courts hold employers liable whenever they 
take an adverse employment action based on an individual’s religion, 
whether perceived or actual. This will ensure victims of misperception 
discrimination are adequately compensated for their damages, while 
sending a strong message to employers that any form of religious 
discrimination will not be tolerated. 
The courts are presently divided over whether Title VII prohibits 
misperception discrimination. Although legislative intent, EEOC 
guidance, and the broader federal antidiscrimination scheme favor 
recognition of misperception claims, some courts refuse to acknowledge 
such claims until Congress amends Title VII to include a “regarded as” 
provision comparable to the ADA. While a congressional amendment 
may be ideal, it is not necessary after Abercrombie. Although the case 
was decided in the context of a religious accommodation, its holding 
directly applies to misperception-based religious discrimination claims. 
The Supreme Court made clear that disparate-treatment liability under 
Title VII is premised on an employer’s motives, not its actual 
knowledge. As such, whether an employer is aware of an employee’s 
actual religious beliefs is unimportant; what matters is whether religion 
in general motivated the employment decision. 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act more than five decades ago 
with the goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace. To reach 
this goal, it is not enough to prohibit discrimination based on an 
employee’s actual religion. Indeed, employers can and do discriminate 
based on erroneous beliefs, assumptions, and stereotypes about 
religion. And given the growing complexity of the religious landscape, 
the likelihood of employers discriminating against employees based on 
erroneous assumptions about religion is likely only to increase. Such 
discrimination is no less malicious or injurious simply because the 
employer was wrong. If anything, it may be worse because the 
employer is not only biased but also ignorant. To truly end religious 
discrimination in the workplace, Title VII must be read as prohibiting 
both conventional and misperception-based discrimination. Although 
this interpretation has long been defensible, after Abercrombie it seems 
necessary. 
